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Fucking Law (A New Methodological Movement) 
Victoria Brooks, University of Westminster (for Journal of Organizational Ethnography)
This paper sets the groundwork for a new methodological movement. I claim that 
methodological strategies must take as their object the laws with found sexual identity, 
or rather should be ‘fucking with’ law by creatively confronting, occupying and agitating 
limiting ethical frameworks that control access to the field. The movement is 
ethnographic, since it finds research ethics and ‘straight’ academic space’ to be where 
these rules are the most harmful in limiting access to the field, for female researchers 
in particular. The approach (but also to some extent the target) is Deleuzian and post-
Deleuzian philosophy whose theoretical leaps have sought to shift and cause slippage 
in laws of sexual identity. However, when these laws are tested by researchers 
proposing to access the field, specifically ethnographically and autoethnographically, 
it is clear they have not ‘slipped’ at all. This is clear through the questions raised by 
ethics committees. Fucking law therefore becomes a methodological movement 
intimately connecting ethical agendas and sex as an encounter in the field. I claim the 
methodological movement of ‘fucking’ law captures, or at least attempts to capture, 
the slipperiness of the body, the encounter, the research project and sex itself. The 
movement that is ‘fucking law’ is essential in agitating and occupying not only 
philosophy, but limiting institutional research agendas and their ethical frameworks. 
The implications of ‘Fucking Law’ will be necessarily unpredictable, but the main 
practical and connected social implication is a questioning as to why more women are 
not practically questioning arguably one of the biggest questions: the ethics of 
sexuality. Fucking law argues for the questioning of these laws with bodies, and 
experimenting with philosophies which underpin and create institutional ethical rules. 
Introduction
In sexuality research, the challenge for a participatory researcher is: how far should ‘I’ 
go, or rather, how far is it ethical to go? The more pressing question, I would argue, is 
how far is it ethical to step back. I claim here that the answer to this question levelled 
at a researcher in the sexuality field goes to the core of ethical questions at every level 
of the sexual research encounter: methodologically, philosophically and non-
philosophically (or personally). My claim is that undertaking ethical research in this 
field demands a new, brave, sensitive, confrontational and slippery fucking 
methodological movement. ‘Fucking Law’ is a methodological movement embodied 
by the individual body of the researcher. It is a movement that acknowledges the 
philosophical, methodological and philosophical and non-philosophical lines which 
traverse this individual body, while also letting, encouraging and empowering that 
same body to push, agitate and urgently question these lines. 
2In sexuality research these ethical questions are urgent. I am among a statistically 
small group of women carrying out participatory research in the field of sexuality,1 and 
this is concerning. The urgency of this situation cannot be overstated, since while 
philosophy and method have taken a radical, critical and feminist turn, presence within 
the field itself, has not. This brings me to ask, why are there so few of us here? De 
Craene (2017) in relation to sexual geography fieldwork, has suggested that this may 
be because of a certain ‘discomfort’ associated with the complexities of being a woman 
researcher. I claim that this ‘discomfort’ is at the core of why radical, fluid, sensitive 
and provocative methods are required in this field, which probe at, and seek the origins 
and academic consequences of this ‘discomfort’. This is a crucial endeavour, since 
this discomfort is only the beginning, with the weighty consequence of such reactions 
being that this reticence feeds into the construction of sexuality work as ‘dirty work’ 
thereby limiting the range of bodies taking part, and inhibiting the production of, and 
funding for production of, sexual knowledge (Irvine, 2014). 
During this paper, I find that the reason for this is that entering the field of sexuality as 
a woman is hard. It is ethically hard – both institutionally and personally. Carrying out 
sexuality work is consistently to be the ‘rebel’ or the one people in your department 
are unsure of how to ‘react to’, in the face of consistent ‘deep cultural anxieties about 
[this area] of study’ (Irvine, 2014). This position arises from cultural anxiety, but also 
personal anxiety, since with the announcement of ‘I do participatory sexuality work’ 
comes the suggestion that I have a clear connection (troubled or otherwise) with sex, 
which could either titillate or often in my experience, produce discomfort in others, as 
well as in myself because of their reaction. Newton (1993) already predicted these 
kind of issues, with the advent of the female sexual fieldworker, comes the swirling 
uncertainties of their sexualities; having once been the absorber (or partner) of the 
male anthropologist, she now suddenly has her own sexual agency and investment in 
the field. How terrifying it must be for those who encounter us, how difficult it must be 
to not know which end of the spectrum of female identity we are at: whether we are 
angelic, pure and objective, or rather whores, unable to resist our dissolution into 
encounters. Consequently, women are also unable to benefit from the ‘veil of 
professional silence’ that exists towards men who have casual sex with women in the 
field (Newton, 1993). As Dubisch (1995) has noted from her personal experience, it is 
often the inclination of those engaging with the female researcher, that she has no 
desire for encounters with male bodies in the field. As the author goes on to say, it 
would be even more outrageous were she to write about such an attraction or 
encounter (Dubisch, 1995). 
What flows from this is the most problematic of all concerns, that it appears to be a 
‘radical’ position to write about emotional, individual and sexual ‘draws’ to the field as 
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 By ‘this field’ I mean in the participatory ethnography, and the ethics of sexuality in particular. 
The field sadly shrinks further when narrowing to a focus on the legalities and ethics of the 
broad field of sexuality.
3part of the field (Moreno,1995). The field is thus not only the physical space entered 
by the researcher, but the whole milieu, that is, the researcher’s body, the academic 
institution of which the researcher is part, the physical space of the field, and the 
emotional and sexual body, of the researcher and other bodies in the field.
The clear tension reverberating through the bodies of female researchers in the 
sexuality field, and the field itself, is as problematic as it is illuminating. I argue that 
this space is created by the legalities of the research encounter. These legalities are 
the most visible and obvious actualization of all the tensions female researchers have 
identified: research ethics. Research ethics are not only institutional, but as I shall 
argue, also highly personal. This institutional and personal difficulty in entering the 
field originates from a fundamentally legal place. It is research ethics that place before 
us the embodied reality of the philosophical laws of the body. These translate into the 
methodological and ethical laws which malign the body even before it thinks of 
entering the field, which make it stop. Dead. Le petite mort tempers and pacifies the 
pre-orgasmic researcher body before she can even contemplate the encounters she 
seeks to sketch, understand and write. Even if such a body manages to remain 
aroused and step into the field, the proverbial ice-cube will quell any possibility of 
finding the truth of sexuality, since law will not leave her in peace, to fuck peacefully. 
I shall go on to argue throughout this paper that in the name of those of us who, against 
the odds, against law, against ethics, against institution, against lovers, have entered 
the sexuality field, that we need to start ‘fucking law’. This is to create the path for 
others to continue preventing the institutional marginalization of sexuality work (Irvine, 
2014). I shall argue that every ‘against’ is a movement toward a law that needs to be 
‘fucked’. Fucking is the only way, since ‘against’ is not vociferous enough to translate 
these into research (and pedagogical) agendas. Fucking is the slippery business of 
connecting sexual practice with social pejorative, with institutional agitation, with 
ethical agenda, with finally, the perturbation of the oppressive philosophical foundation 
of heteronormative identities and laws of the body.  
Fucking Philosophy
And love, where all is easy,
Where all is given in the instant;
There exists in the midst of time
The possibility of an island.2
The ‘first’ level of fucking perhaps the most obstinate of encounters. While it is 
arguably easy to fuck anywhere, there is nothing so difficult to shift than the internal, 
2
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4philosophical ‘laws’ of the body. Post-structural philosophy such as that of Deleuze 
and Guattari has long since taken the body away from stability, Cartesian separation 
and Kantian morality, riding on a Spinozan wave to open the possibility for embodied 
ethics (Lambert, 2006). Embodied ethics empower the body, to make its own 
‘decisions’ through the ethical demands of ‘encounters’ (Grear, 2011; Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos, 2015). Feminist thought has radicalised this position and radically 
sexualised this position, with the joining of voices from a variety of philosophical 
disciplines. In relation to law, the legal body is both vulnerable and empowered (Grear, 
2011). Feminist scholars have argued robustly against the stability and rationality of 
the assumed legal subject, as incompatible with the onto-ethical demands of the 
feminist project, and built the legal body as not exclusively human (Fineman, 2012). 
The legal body has been ‘freed’ by philosophy, or so we are told. The legal body has 
moved from a categorised amalgam of legally owned ‘parts’ (Hyde, 1997) toward a 
body which is as radical, slippery and volatile as the philosophy which found this to be 
wrong. Authors such as Elizabeth Grosz are heavy-weight presences in creating the 
theoretical anti-Cartesian conditions for the mere possibility of this resistance too, 
through the revolutionary re-situation of the feminine body as inherently productive, as 
well as disruptive, of epistemological regimes created through traditional 
understandings of the body, space and time, as well as sexuality (Grosz 1994; 1995). 
In terms of law however, there is a difficulty in terms of legal personhood specifically 
in limiting the feminine body’s capacity to be empowered against and with legally 
imposed/assumed vulnerabilities, together with the ethics of productive corporeal 
empowerment. Critical legal thought has brought the body closer to a philosophically 
free body. Therefore it is clear that only through interdisciplinarity has law even invited 
the possibility of being ‘fucked’ (confronted, agitated, provoked) into revising the ways 
it judges and defines bodies. 
We have seen from Irvine (2014) that academia, the quintessential philosophical 
space and arguably the natural research space, remains constrained by law, with 
sociologists doing sexual work reporting an absence of training, structural support and 
passive disparagement of their field, stigmatization, and the perception that 
quantitative methods are more valuable.  Further than this, this kind of marginalization 
stretches forth from a molecular institutional level, toward a macro (US) governmental 
level with the blocking of funding for so-called ‘risky’ sexuality work (Irvine, 2014). Here 
we see the instantiation of the necessity of the interdisciplinarity of legal critique, as 
well as resistance. Law would have us respect the judgments of those in power in 
institutions and government, those with the authority of law and the power to make 
decisions and set academic, pedagogic and research agendas. Despite the clear 
radicalization of law and the critique of body-defining laws and identities, these laws 
have not shifted, nor stopped exercising their power in response to the sexuality of 
women. 
This is even more apparent when one enters, or attempts to enter the field and 
explicitly test and target these ‘new’ interdisciplinary ways of thinking the body, the 
5response of ethical regimes within academic institutions suggest that these laws have 
not slipped at all. I am still part of a tiny minority of women testing sexual ethics with 
their bodies. How can this be? I can only find that philosophical thought has not taken 
the body far enough. May the position be more disturbing that we thought. Perhaps 
those philosophical laws are so deep, so resolutely internalised and spread through 
the blood of the body that they stop the body moving – no matter how radical - the 
‘cock of greasy philosophy’, dead, weeping, protruding from every philosophy 
(Rhymbu, 2016).3 The closest we come to escaping the shackles is to look at how this 
philosophy makes us move, and it is my claim that the ethics flowing from these 
philosophical laws would have us stop at the threshold of participation. However, 
Preciado took these philosophies and fucked them – s/he entered the field, charted 
his/her journey with unflinching detail and undertook the bravest of projects – to find 
where her individual sexuality was traversed by what is not hers through embodied 
radical philosophical practice (Preciado, 2013). S/he begins her journey by setting the 
agenda by opening with Derrida’s ‘amusing’ statement as to what he would like to see 
in a documentary on Heidegger, Kant, or Hegel: ‘for them to talk about their sex life’ 
(Preciado, 2013). Immediately we find the playfulness and the confrontational effect 
of the sexual: suddenly, philosophy is fucked, but only through the fucking of 
philosophers.
It has long since been found (by philosophers) that philosophy cannot be separated 
from bodies that think and create their concepts (Deleuze and Guattari, 2011). This 
conjoining was framed as subverting the Cartesian idea that separates concepts as 
disconnected instruments of reason from the bodily workings of thinking itself. 
Concepts therefore grow and develop with the body that uses them as tools, such that 
the concepts themselves are embodied and performed and mixed with the flesh of 
researchers. This is liberating, yet also alarming in view of the problematic instantiation 
of law as power in academia. The laws might therefore be more open to ‘fucking’ 
through institutional agitation, but they are also obstinate. Preciado fucks him/herself 
from the very start, attesting to the only possibility of overcoming the penetration of 
the cock of greasy philosophy through fucking it right back. We must find then that 
there is both a connection and a distance between a sexual life and philosophy, and 
that a definite move is required to enter, and to agitate, the relation between fucking 
and philosophy. We, who are interested in overcoming and agitating these laws, must 
become fucking philosophers: the ‘fucking theories’ cannot save us (Rhymbu, 2016).
3
 Extract from Rhymbu’s ‘Sex is a Desert’ 
‘…the dead cock that protrudes from every philosophy
Alain Badiou fucking theories, numbers,
a weeping member, the cock of greasy philosophy
what are you good for, if you could only save us…’
6Fucking Method
Nothing. Waiting. Then, an extraordinary lucidity settles in, gradually, accompanied 
by a desire to fuck, walk, go out everywhere in the city… My body is present to 
itself.4 
Those thinking the field have also tried. Fucking has started to become the vestige of 
radical researchers. Bell called urgently for geography to be ‘fucked’ (Bell, 2009). He 
dared to say, ‘fuck you’, and directed a powerful and playful provocation at his field. 
He finds power in the word ‘fuck’ which of course, in most cases will prevent 
publication or presentation within all but the most radical academic arenas (Bell, 2009). 
Bell attributes this fear to not only banal academic conservativism, but a deeper fear 
of the slipperiness of the body, and the messy materiality of bodies (Bell, 2005). The 
word ‘fuck’ is provocative to be sure, but it is as slippery as the encounter it 
linguistically reflects. To say fuck, is to ask the other to contemplate the possibility of 
being fucked: confronted, titillated, rendered unintelligible, perhaps joyous, perhaps 
destabilised, and at worst, emotionally or physically suffering. Fucking is not 
necessarily positive, nor is it necessarily negative. Rather, it is the movement that is 
necessary in the face of an academic environment that is prone to marginalize 
sexuality work, and/or prioritize quantitative methodological approaches. It seems that 
so long as there is distance between the researcher and sex, in research endeavor 
and in presentation of research, then those in power can rest. Fucking refutes this 
distance, and says yes to explicit connection to sex as that which happens in the field, 
no matter the identity of the researcher, and yes to the connection between this and 
sexual knowledge production. 
Methodological thinking has begun to take this radical turn. Sexuality research has 
been called a ‘research assemblage’ by Fox and Alldred, meaning that the researcher 
must be seen as entering into a relation with the bodies of the field as part of an event, 
and not distanced, objective bodies using their tools upon ‘objects’ (Fox and Alldred, 
2013). This position finds the very act of being situated a methodological position in 
itself, and for the registering and understanding of sexual encounters as a particular 
kind of assemblage. This, although becoming a conceptual tool for the researcher, 
does not help us with the ethics of participation. For if we are to say that we are situated 
among a sexuality assemblage, how far can our relations extend, in the name of 
‘research’ – in short, what are the ethics of such an assemblage, being intimately 
connected to these bodies and then fucking?
If the decision as to participation in sexuality research seems to be such a dilemma, 
as pioneers such as Dean, Preciado and Irvine (discussed above) have found, then it 
becomes an ethical call in itself to account for that decision in the course of radical 
4
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7sexuality ethnographic work (Dean, 2009; Lambevski, 1999). Letting in the non-
philosophical in this way has itself become controversial, and in need of radical 
account. Playing with data is not a new position to take. Hofness and Sonenberg and 
Honan have already found the necessity on the back of the tenets of radical philosophy 
to open the horizons of data (Hofsess and Sonenberg, 2013; Honan, 2007). Opening 
data’s horizons means accepting its inherent multi-directional instability, and the effect 
of the researcher on transfiguring data into ‘new lines of flight’ (Hofsess and 
Sonenberg, 2013).
What is new here, is the possibility of combining new ways of conceiving of the life of 
data, but also combining this with the sexual life of the researcher. It is 
autoethnography as a methodological plane that has begun explicitly do this, and to 
allow the researcher themselves to track their personal investment in the ethics of 
sexuality, together with their theoretical, academic and methodological journey 
(Brooks, 2016). It seems though, that in the field of sexuality and participatory 
methodologies, the field is depressingly small, especially when it comes to 
autoethnographers, and miniscule when it comes to female autoethnographers. The 
exception could be Stein, albeit her study concerned a record of the ethics of writing 
of other’s sexuality, rather than hers specifically (Stein, 2010). It is not surprising, 
however, when we read of Stein’s experiences and discomforts (Stein, 2010). At the 
threshold of sexual participation, the feminine self seems to retreat to text, and I find 
that given my own experience, there are good reasons for this fear of fucking. This 
fear is sometimes created and wielded by the creators of those very concepts that 
have become the laws of our bodies.
Fucking Philosophers
after falling in love with you, why is she so interested in this sexuality… coming back 
to the male issue, she said that there is something in your behavior that makes her 
worried for me, that there is something quite male in you5
Geographers entering the field of sexuality are predominantly men. Despite the huge 
leaps forward driven by feminist thinking, De Craene, and indeed I, felt we must justify 
our positions as female researchers in sexuality research. Further than this, I too 
apparently ‘needed’ a dose of masculinity before I began my own autoethnographic 
project. I needed to be called a man, or my sexuality needed to be called male, and 
my research endeavor needed to be called a leap toward what he called ‘sexual 
freedom’ and confined to my ‘male sexuality’. These suggestions that I am making, 
are precisely at the core of the ethical urgency for law to be fucked, and in the coming 
paragraphs I shall make a claim as to why. 
5
 Extract from correspondence from my philosopher lover in November 2014 upon my return 
from my fieldwork at the nudist beach at Cap D’Agde in July 2014.
8Along with others, I have found that sexual encounters generate their own ethics, in 
accordance with a Spinozan/Deleuzian philosophical foundation. However, I have 
found that this frame continues to hold the encounter in accordance with law, with the 
law retaining a ‘stamp’ on immanent encounters (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2015). 
I have claimed that ‘escape’ beyond this philosophical frame is necessary, through the 
performative reality of the Laruellian One (l’un). Laruellian immanence can be a 
transitionary device, creating the path from philosophy to field, from page to practice, 
from radical Deleuzian philosophy to living, breathing, performative sexual ethics 
(Brooks, 2016). The same has been claimed in relation to the potentials of Laruellian 
philosophy for art/fiction practice (O’Sullivan, 2017).   
Laruelle arguably does not advance Deleuzian thinking on the reality of immanence, 
yet in the field, such an advance is urgently required if we are to look back at the 
apparently limiting philosophical tenets of even radical methodological approaches to 
the ethics of participatory sexuality research. I have claimed that Laruelle adds to the 
immanent plane a possibility for an outside of ethics, a chance for radical difference to 
be performed by the body through non-philosophy. We must be careful though. ‘Non-
philosophy’ is dangerously close to philosophy, you only have to look at the name and 
the author who created it. 
Before, during and after my own autoethnographic sexuality project, I remained a 
‘threat’ somehow to my lover at the time (Brooks, 2016). My lover was a philosopher, 
and so was I (albeit reluctantly). I mean this in the literal sense, in that we were both 
academics in the field of law and philosophy, but also in the sense that we were 
contemplating the ethics of our own encounter. Upon me, I found imposed (repeatedly) 
a version of my identity that did not belong to me. Flowing from this identity, came a 
perceived ethical threat emanating from the ‘mystery’ of my sexuality, or my lack of 
coherence in the face of the assertion of a heteronormative schema. I suggest that the 
bodies of philosophers are no more adept at being objective than sexuality field 
researchers. They are no better equipped at determining the laws or sexual ethics of 
the body, than any-body who has sex, yet it is these laws that I, and I am sure others, 
find repeatedly asserted; by our judges whether they be lovers or juridical.
My own sexual work encounter was with plage naturist in Cap D’Agde (‘the Cap’) 
(Brooks, 2016). This was a theoretical (Deleuzian and post-Deleuzian thought) as well 
as applied project, where unexpectedly, method and research ethics became the 
significant focus. When I say research ethics, I mean both institutional and personal. 
It was the ethical challenges of my personal sexual encounters that I found traversed 
by legalities, or collective ethics. For this project, I visited the nudist beach at the Cap 
in July 2014 for a three-week period (this was peak season where the site welcomes 
in the region of 40,000 visitors, some of which take part in open public sex on the 
beach and among the dunes, often with multiple partners) (Brooks, 2016). During this 
project, I produced a ‘field diary’ which recorded and reflected upon my encounters at 
9the Cap. I chose this auto-ethnographic method precisely because it would hold the 
potential to bridge the gap between individual and collective, or otherwise allow my 
‘ethnography to discover the individual’ (Muncey, 2010). In this way, I could bring my 
intensely personal sexual ethical dilemmas into my project and find where they were 
traversed by collective legalities and effects of identities. 
My lover raised a salient point, though. Why then, was I there? The answers to this 
question are complex and deeply theoretical, and which I have attempted to answer 
elsewhere (Brooks, 2016). The important aspect for Fucking Law, is that non-
philosophical transparency is essential in agitating the deepest philosophical tenets of 
sexuality. The questions between my lover and I were as old as humanity itself, but 
why was the asking of these questions so violent? Why was my presence there so 
frightening? I found that interrogation of this question is enriched through turning at 
the same time toward the institution’s objections to my entry onto the field. 
De Craene (2017) has carried out vital work in the field of geography, where she has 
recognized both the problematic position of female researchers in sexuality research 
in the field of geography, and the necessity of addressing this: ‘After all, the absence 
of the lusty researcher’s body has methodological, epistemological, and political 
consequences and therefore disciplines the production of knowledge, also within 
critical sexuality studies’ (De Craene, 2017). I join her voice resolutely and humbly and 
say that the kind of movement the author is advocating is precisely what is needed. 
De Craene points to the problematic confluence of emotional and academic forces, 
which converge to produce legal conflicts in terms of gendered and sexual identity. 
The author also points unflinchingly toward the ethical stakes involved in disclosing 
our desires, as researchers. These ethical stakes might involve the success of our 
academic careers, and conjoined with this, I claim, the extent to which we can ever 
understand sexuality. De Craene (2017) is situated right in front of the line, at the 
precipice of fucking law, by fucking ethics:
transgressing different norms on what constitutes as ‘good research’ (i.e. body 
work and sexuality) does not come without risks, as it involves giving up a 
position of privilege and involves a degree of emotional labour which might be 
crossing boundaries of what a researcher might be motivated or required to do 
in order to achieve a certain degree of epistemologically, ethically and 




‘…you just documenting people fucking and men masturbating but it does not do 
anything more to you anymore, but how am i supposed to feel, it is all simple for you 
on the white warm sand’6
It is the frank interrogation of the link between philosophy and body (personal ethics) 
and research ethics (institutional ethics) that allow for the possibility of fucking law, or 
otherwise of understanding, exploring and playing with identity and its impossible 
grasp of the slippery sexy body. 
Any project that is by association with the researcher part of an institution will need to 
go through the requisite ‘ethical approval’ processes. My own project, although 
eventually approved, much to the credit of my institution and careful engagement by 
its Research Ethics Committee, underwent close scrutiny. The ethical scrutiny it 
received revealed some much-treasured legalities of feminine sexuality. 
The concerns of the Ethics Committee were as follows:
• The Committee have serious concerns about your safety given you will 
be working off-campus with negligible support in a potentially dangerous 
environment where individuals nearby could be actively seeking a sexual 
encounter.
• The Committee were unclear how you would record the observations, for 
example would you propose relocating to improve the quality of your 
observations, and if so how would you be able to guard against 
suspicions being raised about your activity.  Is it possible to undertake 
covert observations in this way and at the same time remain 
inconspicuous?7
• Concepts of privacy could be contentious.  While the research will be 
undertaken on a public beach, the individuals being observed may view 
their area as being a private or semi-private space.  As there are quite 
strict laws in France relating to privacy has there been any assessment 
of the legality of the proposed research in the local context?  Can you 
6 Extract from correspondence from my philosopher lover in July 2014 during my fieldwork at 
the nudist beach at Cap D’Agde.
7
 At all times I ensured that my note-taking was inconspicuous, that all data was anonymised 
and that my presence as researcher was never revealed. I have also avoided graphic 
description of encounters in case of any possibility of any identification or unease.  I would 
also like to thank many members of the Law School at the University of Westminster for their 
assistance in drafting and considering the response to the Committee, particularly concerning 
the ‘privacy’ aspect in the next concern listed, where consideration of strict French privacy 
laws was required.  
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confirm that any proposed covert observations will only take place on 
people who are in a space that could be reasonably be observed by 
others, the individuals would have no expectation of privacy and that you 
will not follow individuals to better observe them should they go behind 
bushes/into caves, etc.? 
• Have you considered recruiting “Key Informants”? i.e. recruit users of 
these areas as a means of reducing safety concerns, however, it is 
recognised this would have an impact upon your proposed methodology 
and may provide less satisfactory data.8
I found in the course of the writing-up of this project that these very legal concerns are 
somewhat disingenuous, since they stem from a much deeper fear of the subject 
matter: sex, or rather, fucking. The ethical schemata, as revealed by my judges (the 
Committee members themselves) are based on decision-making frameworks that 
comprise metrics of merit and integrity, justice, beneficence and respect (Halse, 2011). 
I claim that these do not constitute an ethical frame, but a legal frame. The Committee 
presides in a particular context which renders it ethical, since its decisions relate 
directly to, and are contingent upon, a projected encounter. However, the co-ordinates 
set out in Halse’s example which relate to a highly sensitive (fictional) context of 
married men and their use of child prostitutes, are unethical. Halse goes on to critique 
the strictly moral basis of these decisions and suggests that greater scrutiny be given 
in the light of the neo-liberal self-interested space of the academic institution (Halse, 
2011). The author writes: 
As with other national ethics guidelines, an ethical framework of principlism is 
not based on a single, coherent ethical theory but a set of practical principles 
that draw on an amalgam of philosophical perspectives: Kant (autonomy); 
Rawls (justice); Mills (beneficence); and Gert (nonmaleficence) (p242).
Halse points to the ‘universal philosophical’ underpinning to Ethics Committee 
decisions, which take for granted the basis on which the legal person is formed. This 
‘taking for granted’ rests at the core for the need for ‘fucking ethics’, not just an ethics 
of fucking. There is nothing in this institutional ‘ethical’ framework which indicates its 
decisions will be truly ‘ethical’ in the context of the complex philosophically and legally 
inhibited field that is sexuality. To be ethical in this context entails connection, as well 
as faithfulness to the field.
The Ethics Committee is of course compiled of bodies. Institutional bodies, and 
creators of concepts (legalities) which as critical scholarship has found, are 
8
 These passages are lifted directly from the initial decision by the Ethics Committee. See 
Correspondence (decision and my response) at Appendix 1 of Brooks (2016). 
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predominantly ‘straight’ (Bolton, 1995) This term is not used in the heterosexual 
orientation sense, but rather as the antithesis of ‘queer’. Halse (2011) felt the need 
herself to make a ‘confession’ as to this reality. This indeed should be applauded, but 
the question comes as to the harmfulness of this reality, and indeed what to do about 
it. 
This is where I make my claim to occupation of academic space, and translate that 
into a call for the fucking of law, as a methodological movement directed at research 
ethics and a particular legality of sexuality, and obstruction to the field. David Bell says 
in an interview on his essays that ‘fucking’ was initially part of his work as firstly a 
‘playful provocation’, but also somewhat of a ‘joke’, stemming from a desire to confront 
his discipline and express his exasperation (Silva and Vieria, 2010). This brave 
gesture is no joke. Or rather, it may be, but it is one of those ‘jokes’ which carry with it 
significant truth. The Ethics Committee’s power to have potentially stopped my project, 
and the abuse from my lover at the time, is no joke. I do not mean this simply in terms 
of personal suffering, but more in the consistent concealment, denial and lack of deep 
understanding and sensitive questioning as to the truth of sex. Without fucking, this 
truth will remain ‘concealed and censored’, with researchers doing sexual work 
disadvantaged professionally, promoted and funded unequally, and subjugated by 
institutional ethical bias (Irvine 2014). 
It was clear too that the legalities of identity reared their head again, with a transparent 
fear as to whether I might be a sex-crazed woman, a ‘pervert’, or I might be a naïve 
pure woman, where they are responsible for protecting me against corruption. This 
‘treasuring’ of such heteronormative identities must stop because it is a symptom of 
not only straight academia, but a conservative and restrictive agenda that is actively 
inhibiting research, as sending the message that it is ‘OK’ to judge those doing sexual 
work. As Irvine (2014) found, some academics have refused to work with respondents 
due to perceived ‘unethical’ practice and ‘immorality’. These perceptions of academia 
are legal: flowing from the philosophical laws of the body and folding into ethical 
institutional agendas. 
Bell was expressing a desire to fuck ‘with’ geography, and I say that my desire is to 
fuck (with) law. To fuck as a researcher, questioning and studying sexuality, to ‘mess’ 
with law, by confronting it with its ethical basis, or the encounters from which it gains 
its rules and its strength, and which it treats as its court – or that which must be judged. 
Bell finds that geography could not be fucked, and that ‘shock’ at his vocabulary was 
absorbed (Silva and Vieria, 2010). My methodological suggestion though is not fuck 
law, but fucking law. Indeed, it is the case, that people stop listening. It may be the 
case already that my fucking in this text has become banal, indeed annoying. But this 
is the very point. The shock comes, inevitably within the academic discipline, and my 
suggestion is that it will never be acceptable to fuck. But, there are infinite points along 
the research process and within the academic space where the shock will be felt, and 
reflection, introspection, violence and possibility, will inspire change.
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What is fucking law?
The presence of sex within fucking law is as mysterious as the matter of sexuality. An 
impossible fish to catch, observe or measure, as I found in my study of law’s 
relationship with sexuality (Brooks, 2016). I suggest there are ‘four folds of fucking’: 
Fucking Philosophy; Fucking Method, Fucking Ethics and finally, Fucking Law. We 
have seen above the necessity for Fucking Philosophy (in not taking for granted 
philosophical definitions and prescribed movements of bodies, even if they come from 
radical philosophy). We have also seen the necessity and basic groundwork for 
Fucking Ethics and Fucking Method, above, but what then, is Fucking Law? What are 
we trying to do and how does it look as a concrete research agenda?
Fucking law is a movement, which flows from the researcher’s body and resonates 
through the research process (from the choosing of a philosophical framework, 
through ethical approval, and through non-philosophical expression and action in the 
field) where it occupies unexpectedly, provocatively and sensitively.  The researcher 
must become at once impetuous (Silva and Vieria, 2010) but also transgressive (De 
Craene, 2017). This is not transgression in a banal sense, but in a broader, bigger and 
vital sense: the recognition and intricate negotiation of ethical lines. 
I make no claim that I am the first to fuck law. I do not claim that autoethnography is 
the only way to be fucking law – it is but only one possible path. There are researchers 
all around me fucking in all manner of different ways, and we are starting to become 
radically annoying. Agitators. Those such as De Craene, Bell, Binnie and Preciado are 
at the vanguard, and all I seek to do is join their voices and add to their song, which I 
hope to be written delicately across research agendas and ethical frameworks in this 
field. 
A vital instantiation of fucking law is, as De Craene has noted, the call for introspection 
and examination of the researcher’s situatedness within the assemblage (Fox and 
Alldred, 2013). It is introspection and confrontation combined provocatively toward 
research ethics, and a call to occupy the neo-liberal, self-interested space that is 
‘straight’ academia (Binnie, 2009). The word ‘fucking’ still hangs, provocatively 
unfolded as to its precise addition (aside from provocation) to my methodological 
claim. Perhaps it should remain unfolded and holding loosely its slippery meanings – 
to fuck (with). It is clear though, that fucking with academia is necessary, even at the 
linguistic level. I have, like Bell, been told to remove the word ‘fuck’ from the titles of 
my work, with claims that this kind of language would be potentially ‘offensive’.9 There 
9
 I have had a similar experience as David Bell in relation to ‘fucking’ titles. A recent publication 
of mine (after extensive correspondence) was permitted, but not until the ‘fuck’ was changed 
to a ‘f#ck’. 
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is a call here that returns us to the beginning of my piece here – that philosophy and 
its modes of expression require intervention. 
This is a further aspect of fucking law. The ethical call is that of seeking out the modes 
through which philosophy is embodied, and how far the researcher’s body is traversed 
by these lines, and whether it can, comfortably, emotionally, sexually, intellectually, 
practically, and ethically move differently. Law’s reach into the identity of researchers 
and the way in which it judges encounters, can be done away with, only through 
performance, feeling and action. The lines might be ‘right’ and this is a possibility we 
must accept too, but not so readily – we must play. Fucking law is to have done with 
judgment, and seek the rebuilding of the courtroom, restore the fucking anarchic 
encounter to itself (Deleuze, 1997; Brooks, 2014). This is only facilitated through 
access to the field, however. 
If we are to fuck (with) law, we need geography, we need art, we need science, we 
need methodology, we need gender, sexuality, culture, environment. We need the 
fucking of disciplinary boundaries wherever it is possible. The bravery of researchers 
in other disciplines is staggering – the pioneering work of Binnie, Bell, De Craene and 
Preciado mean that I could find robust and projects among which to situate my own, 
and empowerment too, to press ahead at times where the possibility of entering the 
field seemed remote and too troublesome – both institutionally and personally. There 
were voices from law too, but the shyness about entering the field of sexuality is 
undeniable. This is an opening of law, albeit resistant, to the potential of other 
disciplines to bring challenges to the sexual tenets of its judgments. Critical legal 
theory tells us that the body is the law’s ‘battleground’, but it is its interdisciplinary 
which sends the body into battle, fucking law from the ethical inside. 
The challenge is whether and indeed how to solidify the movement that is fucking law 
into a concrete research agenda. I certainly do not make a claim that every researcher 
must account for their own erotic subjectivities – indeed my own experience is perhaps 
a case for not doing so, and is why female researchers find themselves vulnerable, 
and reticent to justify their own desires (De Craene, 2017). As a pointer, as to when, 
and how to find points of occupation, I return to fucking itself. 
An Orgasmic Agenda?
Fucking law gains the most ground through advocating as intimate as possible 
connection between the actual field encounter of sex, and the ethical frameworks 
which govern both access, participation and presentation of research. The intimacy of 
this connection produces the ‘points’ of occupation the movement encounters. Sex 
becomes formative of the agenda, as opposed to its object, it is fucking (with) law. The 
researcher body may find itself simultaneously held and released by its identity, with 
its sexual pleasures invested, but also exceeded, problematised and shifted by its 
encounters (Bell, 2011). It has become increasingly apparent that ‘sex’ can be 
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conceived outside of traditional heteronormative penetration, and can be instead 
conceived as an ‘intensity’, or ‘consistency’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a; Beckman, 
2011) that defines the sexuality assemblage (Fox and Alldred, 2013). With a radical 
conception of sex mobilised by feminist radical thinking, we find a radical way of 
orienting (or disorienting) the tenets of sexual identity. Instead of defining an 
encounter’s sexuality and its bodies through the site (spatial and temporal) of the male 
orgasm, we can instead accept that the immeasurable, mysterious, multiple, often 
invisible female orgasm agitates identities from within. The female orgasm has 
simultaneously been silenced and misunderstood, as well as endowed with radical 
potential for intervening in sexual orientation and identity (Beckman, 2013). It is 
through fucking law, that we can adopt radical and inventive methods of tracing these 
potentials. The female orgasm has therefore moved from positioned as secondary to 
male ejaculation, and seen as ‘signifying nothing’ (Beckman, 2013) to becoming the 
force behind ‘Fucking Law’. 
Preciado has found that orgasmic force is genderless, without sexual boundary, 
without orientation and without confinement to any particular organ: ‘the penis 
possesses no more orgasmic force than the vagina, the eye or the toe. Orgasmic force 
is the sum of the potential for excitation inherent in every material molecule… It is a 
source of transformation for the world in pleasure’ (Preciado, 2013). When the 
researcher is faced with such unbounded pleasurable potential, she finds herself the 
source of ethical genesis. Preciado’s potentia gaudendi is within every single molecule 
of each and every encounter – whether we can see it or not – fucking law comes from 
agitation at the most microscopic structural level and thereby generates an 
imperceptible reverberating ethic, within the blood of the researcher, the institution and 
the encounter itself, which cannot always be written, but must be expressed. Such an 
agenda is therefore a necessarily shaky one, with ethical questions arising seemingly 
out of nowhere. Orgasmic investment into the introspection and expression of sexual 
encounter is therefore the key to fucking with any discipline, as Alhadeff (2011) has 
found:
Whether I am viewing my process of ejaculation, my becoming, through the 
uncanny Deleuzian masochist or the Taoist field of immanence, I am positioning 
myself within intuitive re-configuring of socialised sexuality. The nature of this 
collaborative emancipatory project transgresses internalised, invisible, taken-for-
granted capitalist Oedipal structures. Creativity and subjectivity become 
pedagogical strategies for social change (p108).
At my PhD viva, I was asked what I would say to a student who was thinking about 
undertaking a similar project to my own at the Cap. My answer was schizophrenic, 
since I could not say that I wished the struggles I had endured upon another 
researcher. But of course researchers must and will, inevitably since potentia 
gaudendi will take us into the field, again and again.  As researchers, we are often 
teachers, too. Our research is intimately connected to the pedagogic strategies we 
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adopt.10 In this way, fucking law moves from the researcher to students (the next 
generation of researchers, or indeed practitioners) encouraging them and pushing 
them to agitate ethically. 
It is not the case that every project will be appropriate to a ‘Fucking Law’ 
methodological approach. However, I do suggest that a moment may arise, certainly 
in many projects which concern sexuality, where law will need a touch of fucking. It 
may be philosophically, it may be non-philosophically, it may be methodologically, or 
it may be actually fucking, in the flesh. Fucking Law as an agenda, is difficult to pin 
down. Difficult as, it might be said, as the female orgasm is to define, occurring at a 
multitude of expected, and unexpected sites. It could be while reading Deleuze, or it 
could be at night, after the day’s research, it could be at sunrise, or it could be a few 
months after your PhD viva, or it could be in the classroom. Fucking Law is creative 
tracing, occupation, provocation, agitation and expression embodied by researchers 
who will continue to be a nuisance: to their institution, ethics committees, philosophy 
and quite possibly, their lovers. 
Fuck Law 
This sand of 100,000 orgasms, just allowing me to sit, and how I desire just one of 
those at the hands of just one man, such a curious thing.11
Fuck Law. Law won’t ever be fucked, but it’s the fucking that counts. The movement, 
towards all the laws that tell us what sex should be like. Within all that mess, all the 
banality of perversion, all the commodification of what should be ours, behind the 
profiles, the endless updates, the sticky latex and the cock-rings and dildos, gang-
bangs, beyond the dunes, under the surface, beyond the philosophy and non-
philosophy, and past the conversation, far beyond the articles and the books, the 
endless words, the pornography and the dating, moving past even fiction, is the 
possibility, the faint scent, the before-touch, the shy outline, and morning trace, of a 
fucking orgasm.
10
 My own research and teaching practice has been inspired and influenced by that of my PhD 
supervisor, who continually involves his students into his research processes and these 
processes in turn, into his education processes, and so on and on. I express my continuing 
thanks to Andreas for his gentle and unwavering support and encouragement. 
11
 Extract from field diary: 15 July 2014, 6.20am, Brooks (2016).
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